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The Philosophical Significance
of Binary Categories in Habermas’s
Discourse Ethics
By Simon SuSen
Abstract
The philosophical programme associated with the discourse ethics of Jürgen 
Habermas has been widely discussed in the literature. The fact that Haber-
mas has devoted a considerable part of his work to the elaboration of this 
philosophical programme indicates that discourse ethics can be regarded as 
a cornerstone of his communication-theoretic approach to society. In essence, 
Habermas conceives of discourse ethics as a philosophical framework which 
derives the coordinative power of social normativity from the discursive pow-
er of communicative rationality. Although there is an extensive literature on 
Habermas’s communication-theoretic account of society, almost no attention 
has been paid to the fact that the theoretical framework which undergirds his 
discourse ethics is based on a number of binary conceptual divisions. It is the 
purpose of this paper to shed light on the philosophical significance of these 
binary categories in Habermas’s discourse ethics and thereby demonstrate 
that their complexity is indicative of the subject’s tension-laden immersion in 
social reality.
introduction
T he philosophical programme associated with the discourse ethics of Jürgen Habermas has been widely discussed in the literature.1 The fact that Habermas has devoted a considerable part of his work to the elaboration of this philosophical programme indicates that discourse ethics can be regarded as a cornerstone of his communi-
1 See, for example: Alexy (1998); Apel (1990 [1985]); Apel (1996); Benhabib (1990b); Benhabib & Dall-
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cation-theoretic approach to society.2 In essence, Habermas conceives of discourse 
ethics as a philosophical framework which derives the coordinative power of social 
normativity from the discursive power of communicative rationality. According to 
this view, our normative ability to regulate the social world is contingent upon our 
communicative capacity to engage in the discursive problematisation of the world. 
Put differently, legitimate forms of social regulation depend on communicative proc-
esses of collective deliberation.
Habermas’s plea for a discourse ethics reflects a systematic attempt to comple-
ment a sociological theory of communicative action with a philosophical theory of 
communicative ethics. The main strength of such an ambitious endeavour is that it 
allows us—at least in principle—to locate the rational foundations of normativity 
in the linguistic foundations of society. Thus, rather than reducing the search for 
the grounds of normativity to a scholastic exercise of metaphysical speculation, dis-
course ethics situates the grounds of normativity in the linguistic grounds of society: 
communicative action. Our social ability to coordinate our coexistence through our 
daily search for mutual comprehensibility is the basis of our moral ability to regulate 
our coexistence through our daily construction of normativity. 
Although there is an extensive literature on Habermas’s communication-theoret-
ic account of society, almost no attention has been paid to the fact that the theoretical 
framework which undergirds his discourse ethics is based on a number of binary 
conceptual divisions. It is the purpose of this paper to shed light on the philosophical 
significance of these binary categories in Habermas’s discourse ethics and thereby 
demonstrate that their complexity is indicative of the subject’s tension-laden immer-
sion in social reality.
1. theory and Practice
Discourse ethics is essentially concerned with the enlightenment of the human 
condition insisting that, as a species, we have a fundamental interest in “the libera-
tion from the objectified self-deception of dogmatic power” (Habermas 1988 [1971]: 
15). Social emancipation, in this sense, can be conceived of as de-dogmatisation: de-
dogmatisation from implicit, taken-for-granted, and erroneous knowledge claims 
whose reproduction contributes to the subject’s continuous self-deception. In order 
to pave our way out of self-deception, we need to recognise that our interest in en-
lightenment is twofold in that it contains both a theoretical and a practical dimension.
On the one hand, discourse ethics reminds us of “the interest in enlightenment, 
mayr (1990); Benhabib (1990a); Blanke (1991); Finlayson (2000); Gamwell (1997); Garvey (2000); Gilab-
ert (2005); Greig (2004); Honneth (1991 [1986]); Hudson (1993); Hutchings (2005); Kelly (1990); Kemp 
(1985); Lafont (2005); McNay (2003); Nielsen (1995); O’Neill (2000); Schweppenhäuser (1989); Seemann 
(2004); Susen (2009); Tassone (2005); Thompson (2000); Ulbert & Risse (2005); Villoro (1997); Wacquant 
(1992).
2 See, for example: Habermas (1976, 1990 [1983], 1993 [1990], 1993 [1991a], 1996 [1992a], 2001 [1984a]).
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in the sense of a relentless discursive validation of claims to validity” (ibid.; italics add-
ed). Thus, a critical ethics of communication aims to uncover our theoretical interest 
in the discursive problematisation of the world. It thereby encourages us to engage in 
“the discursive dissolution of opinions and norms the validity of which is based on 
unjustified claims, no matter to what extent it is actually accepted” (ibid.). When 
unjustified claims to validity turn out to be unjustifiable, the justification of the un-
justifiable becomes unjustified. Our interest in enlightenment manifests itself in our 
theoretical capacity to distinguish between justified and unjustified forms of validity 
which undergird established frameworks of social acceptability.
On the other hand, discourse ethics seeks to explore “the interest in enlighten-
ment, in the sense of practical change of established condition” (ibid.; italics added). 
Hence, a critical ethics of communication seeks to uncover our practical interest in 
social transformation. It thereby allows us to engage in “the realization of goals which 
demand the risks of taking sides, and thus, precisely, the relinquishment of the neu-
tral role of a participant in discourse” (ibid.). Every linguistic test of discursive ac-
ceptability is an attack on the illusory belief in social neutrality; every discursive 
engagement with society obliges us to position ourselves in relation to established 
forms of normativity; and every social arrangement which is open to discussion is, 
at least potentially, open to change. Unjustified forms of society are based on unjusti-
fied forms of legitimacy. It is the task of discourse ethics to question the validity of 
social legitimacy in terms of its rational defensibility. Our interest in enlightenment 
manifests itself in our practical capacity to build a society whose legitimacy is contin-
gent upon its ability to claim acceptability anchored in rational validity.
In short, if—as subjects capable of speech—we have a theoretical interest in the 
discursive problematisation of the world and if—as subjects capable of action—we 
have a practical interest in the social transformation of the world, discourse ethics is a 
systematic attempt to cross-fertilise our theoretical interest in critique and our prac-
tical interest in change for the pursuit of our common interest in enlightenment. The 
constant transformation of discursive problematisation and the constant problema-
tisation of social transformation are indicative of the intertwinement of our theoreti-
cal and our practical interest in human emancipation.
2. monologue and dialogue
In the light of the dialogical interpretation of the world put forward by Haber-
mas’s discourse ethics, “a monological reinterpretation…is all but impossible” (Hab-
ermas 2001 [1984b]: 118). Subjects capable of speech and action are able to engage in 
communication and interaction. Indeed, monological forms of speech are derived from 
dialogical forms of speech, for we acquire our ability to talk about the world on con-
dition that we are exposed to the experience of talking with the world. Every speaker 
needs a speech community. Only insofar as we are immersed in a communicative 
engagement with the world are we capable of developing a linguistic understanding 
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of the world. Linguisticality is a product of society. We look coexistentiality right in 
the eye when developing our linguistic capacity through our communicative en-
gagement with society.
Thus, it is not a “monological consciousness possessed by atomized interact-
ing subjects” (Ray 2004: 314), but a dialogical consciousness developed by social-
ised interacting subjects which lies at the heart of the coexistential determinacy of 
a maturing humanity. “[D]ialogue of mature, autonomous human beings can take 
place” (Habermas 1988 [1963]: 281) to question the self-referential legitimacy which 
inhabits the monologue of immature, heteronymous human beings. Dialogue is po-
tentially empowering because it obliges the subject to accept that the power of so-
cial acceptability cannot be divorced from the power of communicative rationality: 
every form of social normativity can either persist or perish in the light of its rational 
defensibility. In fact, those forms of normativity which are monologically imposed upon 
society can hardly claim to enjoy genuine legitimacy. By contrast, those forms of 
normativity which are dialogically negotiated by society are likely to be imbued with a 
healthy degree of legitimacy.
Given that discourse ethics locates the emancipatory potential of communica-
tive rationality in the intersubjective nature of ordinary social life, it “grounds the 
hermeneutic utopia of universal and unlimited dialogue in a commonly inhabited 
lifeworld” (Habermas 1987 [1981b]: 134). In this sense, discourse ethics does not 
represent a philosophical conglomerate of scholastic language games removed from 
the quotidian context of social reality; on the contrary, discourse ethics constitutes a 
philosophical programme of critical language use embedded in the everyday world 
of intersubjectivity. The ultimate source of communicative discourse is the ultimate 
resource of the communicative universe: communicative action. Our discursive ca-
pacity to convert the world into an object of contemplation cannot be divorced from 
our communicative capacity to attribute meaning to the world through our quo-
tidian search for mutual comprehension. Our ability to enter into debate with one 
another is inconceivable without our ability to understand one another. Hence, as a 
philosophical framework that emphasises the coexistential significance of dialogue, 
discourse ethics relies not on “the withdrawing of communication into the inward-
ness of a solitary subject” (Habermas 1988 [1971]: 28); italics added), but on the re-
alisation of communication based on the outwardness of the sociable subject. In other 
words, discourse ethics derives its enlightening force from the dialogical nature of 
communicational encounters.
A discourse which is monologically constructed is essentially non-discursive; an 
ethics which is monologically constructed is effectively non-ethical; and a discourse 
ethics which is monologically oriented is both non-discursive and non-ethical. By 
contrast, a discourse which is dialogically constructed is genuinely discursive; an 
ethics which is dialogically constructed is truly ethical; and a discourse ethics which 
is dialogically oriented is both discursive and ethical. The commitment to the nor-
mative force of dialogical encounters not only gives discursive value to our ethical 
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engagement with reality, but it also attributes ethical value to our discursive en-
gagement with society. Indeed, as a communicative programme based on dialogi-
cal rationality, discourse ethics is a normative framework oriented towards reciprocal 
responsibility. Our purposive relation to reality is mediated by our communicative 
relation to society. Thus, it is not in the monological relationship of recognising oneself 
in oneself, but “in the dialogical relationship of recognizing oneself in the other” (Haber-
mas 1988 [1968]: 148)3 that humans “experience the common basis of their existence” 
(ibid.). We become aware of our commonality when exposed to the coexistential 
experience of communicative reciprocity.
3. Privacy and PuBlicity
The relationship between “the private” and “the public” is a key issue of conten-
tion in modern social and political theory.4 Habermas’s writings on the transforma-
tion of the public sphere in the modern world have had a tremendous influence 
on the ways in which the relationship between “the private” and “the public” has 
been conceptualised in recent social and political thought.5 From a communication-
theoretic perspective, it is essential to recognise the preponderance of the latter over 
the former: there is no private person without a public persona; there is no private 
reasoning which is not influenced by public reasoning; and there is no private life 
which is not shaped by the nature of public life. In short, private individuals are pub-
lic individuals because they are social individuals.
If, following Habermas, “[t]he bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above 
all as the sphere of private people come together as a public” (Habermas 1989 [1962]: 
27), then public discourse can be regarded first and foremost as a discourse of pri-
vate people come together as public carriers of communicative reason. Discourse 
ethics affirms the public nature of its own endeavour in that it insists on the social na-
ture of communicative reasoning. Both discourse and ethics are public affairs in that 
they are socially produced and negotiated. A discourse which fails to become public 
is a discourse which fails to have an impact on the symbolic constitution of the world, 
and an ethics which fails to become public is an ethics which fails to shape the moral 
constitution of the world. Subjects capable of speech and action are able to shape the 
normativity of societies capable of change and transformation. 
Discourse ethics is a public ethics in that it relies on the intersubjective nature of 
communicative rationality for the collective scrutiny of social reality. Put differently, 
3 Italics added; “dialogic” replaced with “dialogical”.
4 See, for example: Geuss (2001); Rabotnikof (1997); Rabotnikof (1998); Robbins (1993); Steinberger 
(1999); Weintraub and Kumar (1997).
5 See, for example: Calhoun (1992); Crossley and Roberts (2004); Fraser (1992); Goodnight (1992); Hab-
ermas (1989 [1962]); Habermas (1992a); Holub (1991); Kögler (2005); Ku (2000); Rochlitz (2002); Voirol 
(2003).
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our discursive search for truth and normativity is a coexistential exercise based on 
the public use of communicative rationality. “Truth is public. No determination that 
holds only privately for an individual subject can refer to what is real” (Habermas 
1987 [1968a]: 100; cf. Mitchell 2003: 6). For what manifests itself in the discursive de-
termination of reality is the communicative mediation of society. We have no direct 
access to the world because our sensual perception of the world is mediated by our 
communicative interpretation of the world. Every seemingly private access to reality 
is impregnated with the public determinacy of rationality. To accept that we cannot 
escape society when making sense of reality requires acknowledging that we cannot 
escape the public determinacy of communicative rationality.
Just as “[w]ith the linguistic turn epistemic authority passes over from the private 
experiences of a subject to the public practices of a linguistic community”(Habermas 
2000b: 324), with discourse ethics normative authority passes over from the private 
contemplations of a solitary subject to the public interpretations of a discursive so-
ciety. To be sure, in a rational society, the ultimate source of social coordination is the 
forceless force of linguistic argumentation, and the ultimate guarantee of legitimate au-
thority is the forceless force of communicative rationality. Legitimate forms of political 
and epistemic authority are constantly exposed to public forms of discursive scru-
tiny. “The persuasiveness of an argument stems not from private insight but from 
the opinions which, in the search for rationally motivated agreement, form part of 
the public practice of the exchange of reasons.”6 And the legitimacy of political and 
epistemic authority is rooted not in private sympathy but in the public recognition 
of discursive defensibility. The “public realm of reasons”7 is a sphere of “responsible 
subjects”8 who develop a sense of solidarity through the communicative search for 
collective forms of validity. In brief, from a discourse-ethical perspective, the social 
legitimacy of every private claim to validity depends on its public defensibility.
4. violence and diScourSe
Violence and discourse are antithetical in that the use of the former excludes the 
use of the latter just as the use of the latter excludes the use of the former. As Ricoeur 
(1979: 226) reminds us, “violence is the opposite of discourse.…Violence is always the 
interruption of discourse: discourse is always the interruption of violence” (italics in 
original). Violence cannot be a source of justification, for violence can never justify 
itself through itself. To be sure, violence can impose a specific—for example, politi-
6 Habermas (2001a: 44; my translation). Original text in German: “Darüber, welches Argument über-
zeugt, entscheidet nicht private Einsicht, sondern die im rational motivierten Einverständnis gebündel-
ten Stellungnahmen aller, die an der öffentlichen Praxis des Austauschs von Gründen teilnehmen.“
7 Habermas (2004a: 890; my translation). Original text in German: “in den öffentlichen Raum der 
Gründe.“
8 Ibid. (my translation). Original text in German: “verantwortliche Autoren.”
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cal, territorial, or ideological—form of legitimacy; yet, no matter how forceful and 
effective the imposition of power may be, violence cannot justify a specific form of 
legitimacy. 
A communicative ethics of discourse, then, is diametrically opposed to an instru-
mental ethics of violence: whereas the former is based on the intersubjective force of 
consensual action, the latter is founded on the purposive force of strategic action. 
“Agreement can indeed be objectively obtained by force; but what comes to pass 
manifestly through outside influence or the use of violence cannot count subjectively 
as agreement” (Habermas 1987 [1981]: 287). Hence, whereas genuine agreement can 
only rest on the forceless force of communicative discourse, false agreement can be im-
posed through the forceful force of purposive violence. If we agree on something be-
cause we have good reasons to do so, the consensus we reach can be considered to be 
authentic and worthwhile. If, however, we agree on something because we are forced 
to do so, the consensus we seem to reach is actually a consensus that we fail to reach 
because it is not dialogically achieved by, but monologically imposed upon, us.
In other words, it is communicative, rather than purposive, rationality which 
is essential to the construction of a consensus-oriented, rather than utility-driven, 
society. “A communicatively achieved agreement has a rational basis; it cannot be 
imposed by either party, whether instrumentally through intervention in the situa-
tion directly or strategically through influencing the decisions of opponents” (ibid.). 
Both instrumental action—as a non-social form of teleological action—and strategic 
action—as a social form of teleological action9—do not qualify as motivational cor-
nerstones of consensual action, for it is not by acting upon the world but by acting 
with the world that the normative potentiality of mutual comprehensibility is con-
verted into the coexistential reality of a common humanity.
A “validity claim that is in principle criticisable”10 can contribute to the construc-
tion of a society whose legitimacy is potentially emancipatory. By contrast, a violence 
claim that is in principle non-criticisable contributes to the construction of a society 
whose legitimacy is relatively arbitrary. Our engagement in discourse allows for the 
commitment to the normative accountability of our actions; our engagement in violence, 
on the other hand, aims at the pursuit of the non-normative utility of our actions.
The evolutionary significance of our ability to determine the course of history 
not by the forceful force of violence but by the forceless force of discourse can hardly 
be exaggerated: the legitimacy of a discourse-guided normativity has the power to 
shape the history of a purpose-laden society. The communicative engagement in 
discourse has become such a constitutive component of maturing societies that the 
employment of violence is only conceivable as the refusal to rely on the coordinative 
power of our communicative competence. “To be a potential participant in discourse 
9 On Habermas’s conceptions of instrumental action and strategic action, see, for example, Habermas 
(1971 [1968]: 92), and Habermas (1987 [1981c]: 285).
10 Habermas (1987 [1981c]: 287; italics added; translation modified). On the criticisability of validity 
claims, see also, for example, Susen (2007: 76-77, 244, 266), and Susen (2009: 106).
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means to be human. The decision not to communicate, not to have any authority in 
discourse or to inflict violence upon others, all depends, then, on this prior compe-
tence” (Matustik 1989: 164). Every time we decide to let violence decide, we decide 
to let discourse hide. Every time we decide to let discourse decide, we decide to put 
violence aside. The maturity of the human species derives from its capacity to deter-
mine its own historicity through the accountability of discursive responsibility.
5. autonomy and heteronomy
Discourse ethics is concerned with affirming and defending the autonomy of the 
human subject. Every subject capable of speech and action is capable of contemplation 
and reflection and therefore, at least in principle, also capable of deliberation and decision. 
The fact that both our short-term and our long-term decisions can be subject to dis-
cursive reflection implies that we are able to determine the course of history through 
the power of communicative rationality. If the “free will is the rational will that allows 
itself to be determined by good reasons” (Habermas 2000b: 328), our existential au-
tonomy emanates from our discursive capacity to be guided by critical rationality.
Since we are a linguistic species, our search for liberty is given meaning through 
our search for reasonability. We learn to be free only insofar as we learn to be free 
in relation to one another, and we learn to reason only insofar as we learn to rea-
son with and against one another. Thus, autonomy based on reasonability cannot 
do without a coexistential orientation towards mutual intelligibility. Since discourse 
ethics ascribes paradigmatic status to the sociological significance of the communi-
cative exchange of reasons, it assumes that the construction of personal autonomy 
is inconceivable without the reproduction of social heteronomy. Put differently, the 
human aspiration to individual independence is embedded in human relations of col-
lective interdependence. Indeed, we cannot reach a state of relative autonomy without 
presupposing the omnipresence of our relative heteronomy. Every human fellow 
depends on other human fellows; the formation of the “I” is inconceivable without 
its relation to the “You.” Discourse ethics reminds us of the intersubjective determinacy 
of human subjectivity. It is through the continuous interplay between their relative 
autonomy and their relative heteronomy that human subjects determine the contin-
gency of their own historicity. 
The possibility of relative autonomy is such a precious privilege of humanity that 
moral and juridical arrangements are put in place to preserve and promote the bur-
den of both individual and collective responsibility: “morality and law both serve to 
regulate interpersonal conflicts; and both are supposed to protect the autonomy of 
all participants and affected persons equally” (Habermas 1994: 138). The existential 
value of autonomy is recognised by postconventional forms of morality11: our capac-
ity to situate ourselves outside the material and symbolic constraints imposed upon 
11 See Habermas (1990 [1983]), esp. pp. 160-170.
Volume 3, Number 2, Autumn 2009 105
Binary Categories in Habermas’s Discourse Ethics
us by society stems from our rational ability to provide reasons either to endorse or to 
disavow the validity of a given form of legitimacy. “Like morality, so also legitimate 
law protects the equal autonomy of each person: no individual is free so long as per-
sons do not enjoy an equal freedom” (Habermas 2001b: 779). In short, the freedom of 
the individual depends on the freedom of society. 
To suggest that “the individual liberties of the subjects of private law and the 
public autonomy of enfranchised citizens reciprocally make each other possible” 
(Habermas 1994: 141) means to accept that the freedom of the individual and the freedom 
of society presuppose each other. Put differently, just as the freedom of the individual 
is contingent upon the existence of a free society, the freedom of society is dependent 
upon the existence of free individuals. Discourse ethics is a philosophical attempt to 
recognise that the interdependence of individual and society manifests itself in the 
communicative construction of normative rules oriented towards universal accept-
ability, which are indicative of the “complementary relationship between private 
and civic autonomy” (Habermas 2001b: 780).
Viewed in this light, our capacity “to act autonomously”12 is not a scholastic 
fantasy; on the contrary, its existential significance is captured in the conviction that 
“the idea of freedom gives us the certainty that autonomous action (and the reali-
sation of the kingdom of ends) is possible—and that it is not just counterfactually 
desired”13. In other words, if we are prepared to recognise that “the destruction of 
metaphysics should also contribute to the release of an autonomous morality based 
on merely practical reason,”14 then we are conceptually equipped to do justice to 
the empowering potential of rational self-government. Discourse ethics insists on 
the possibility of determining the course of history by virtue of the rational self-
government of humanity. To be sure, rational self-government allows us to immerse 
ourselves in, and realise the potentials of, the realms of both pure and practical reason: 
in the realm of pure reason, our Verstand enables us to control and shape the con-
stitution of the objective world according to our physical needs; and, in the realm of 
practical reason, our Vernunft permits us to regulate and shape the constitution of 
the normative world according to our social needs. In short, our species-constitutive 
autonomy emanates from our evolutionary capacity to challenge our natural and 
social determinacy through the reflective power of communicative rationality. Dis-
course ethics reminds us of the fact that only insofar as we translate our Erkenntnis-
vermögen (cognitive faculty) into Erkenntnistätigkeit (cognitive action) are we able to 
convert our Vernunftpotentialität (potentiality of reason) into a Vernunftrealität (real-
ity of reason).
12 Habermas (2001a: 28; my translation). Original text in German: “autonom zu handeln.”
13 Ibid., p. 28; italics in original, my translation. Original text in German: “...wonach uns die Idee der 
Freiheit die Gewissheit gibt, dass autonomes Handeln (und die Verwirklichung des Reichs der Zwek-
ke) möglich ist—und uns nicht nur kontrafaktisch angesonnen wird.”
14 Habermas (2004b: 461; my translation). Original text in German: “Die Destruktion der Metaphysik soll 
auch der Freisetzung einer autonomen, auf reine praktische Vernunft gegründeten Moral dienen....”
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6. reaSon and inclination
Firmly situated in the Kantian tradition, discourse ethics regards reason, as op-
posed to inclination, as the normative basis of moral behaviour and moral judge-
ments. According to Kant’s deontological position, it is erroneous “to conceive of 
morality as a matter of feeling.”15 In essence, what manifests itself in the Kantian 
distrust in the normative authority of emotional propensities is the deontological 
scepticism towards empirical contingencies:
Kant thought that sensations were too weak to do the whole job, because they 
were produced through empirical contingencies—the kind of contingencies 
which can either bind ethnic and religious communities together or separate 
them from one another. Kant was of the view that one would need something 
stronger and less contingent than feelings to strive for a cosmopolitan society 
capable of transcending ethnicity and all other contingent moments of 
separation created by empirical relations.16
In other words, whereas the realm of sensations and inclinations is impregnated 
with the contingency of socio-cultural specificity, the realm of reason and duty is orient-
ed towards the universality of transcendental validity. From the Kantian perspective, 
then, reason and inclination are diametrically opposed to one another. Reason can 
provide us with context-transcending grounds on which to justify our actions; inclina-
tions, by contrast, endow us only with context-dependent motives which induce us to 
undertake our actions. Reasons rise above context; inclinations depend upon context. 
Whereas reason allows us to use our Mund (mouth) for the sake of Mündigkeit (re-
sponsibility), inclinations compel us to follow our Triebe (drives) for the sake of Trieb-
haftigkeit (drivenness). The existential ambivalence of the interplay between reason 
and inclination stems from the fact that we are both rational and inclinational beings: 
as subjects capable of speech and action, we are capable of reasoning and action; as 
subjects capable of desire and action, we are capable of projection and action.
 Given that we are torn between the sober faculty of reason and the troublesome 
faculty of inclination, we constantly have to choose between what we should do and 
what we want to do, between the normative imperatives dictated by reason and the 
purposive desires based on inclination. “The (pathological) interest of the senses in 
what is pleasant or useful arises from need; the (practical) interest of reason in the 
15 Rorty (1994: 975; my translation). Original text in German: “Moral als eine Sache des Empfindens zu 
begreifen.”
16 Ibid.; my translation. Original text in German: “Empfinden erschien Kant als zu schwach, um ganze 
Arbeit zu leisten, da es durch empirische Kontingenzen produziert wurde—jene Art Kontingenzen, die 
ethnische und religiöse Gemeinschaften einerseits zusammenhalten, sie aber andererseits von anderen 
Gemeinschaften absondern. Kant war der Ansicht, daß man etwas stärkeres, weniger Kontingentes als 
Empfinden brauche, wenn man eine kosmopolitische Gesellschaft haben wolle, die Ethnizität und alle 
anderen kontingenten, durch empirische Verhältnisse geschaffene Trennungsmomente transzendiere.”
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good awakens a need. In the former case the faculty of desire is stimulated by inclina-
tion; in the latter it is determined by principles of reason” (Habermas 1987 [1968b]: 
198-199). The validity of substantive rationality allows for the construction of an ethi-
cal grammar oriented towards universal defensibility; the validity of instrumental 
proclivity, on the other hand, remains caught up in the reproduction of a situational 
grammar oriented towards contingent opportunity. Following the Kantian tradition, 
discourse ethics makes a case for the context-transcending force of reason derived from 
the communicative force of discourse: only a discourse which transcends the limited 
eye-perspective of a particular community can claim validity in relation to the unlim-
ited mouth-perspective of humanity. The analysis of the relationship between reason 
and inclination inevitably raises the question of the foundations of human freedom:
Kant asks the question, how is freedom possible? The task of explaining free-
dom of the will is paradoxical, because freedom is defined as independence 
of empirical motives…. Freedom could be explained only by our designating 
an interest that men take in obeying moral laws. On the other hand, obeying 
these laws would not be moral action, and thus free action, if it were based on 
a sensual motive. (Ibid.: 199.)
 Hence, according to the Kantian perspective, human freedom is to be conceived 
of as independence from the realm of contingent constraints and empirical motives as well 
as a commitment to the realm of universal laws and categorical imperatives. In essence, 
deontology is the attempt to convert the ontology of morality into the ontology of hu-
manity: as reason-giving beings, we are moral beings, for it is the reflective potential 
of reason which allows us to distinguish what we consider to be right from what we 
consider to be wrong. As rational entities, we have an interest in morality; and, as 
moral beings, we have an interest “in the realization of the ‘glorious idea of a univer-
sal realm of ends in themselves (of rational beings), to which we belong as members 
only if we carefully behave according to maxims of freedom as though they were 
laws of nature’.”17 If we treat maxims of freedom as maxims of life, we can live a free 
life based on maxims of freedom. Whereas proclivity remains trapped in a horizon of 
spatiotemporally defined contingency, rationality derives its currency from its search 
for horizons of morally constituted universality. In other words, it is not “a sensual 
interest” (ibid.: 200) driven by “the natural faculty of desire” (ibid.) but “a pure inter-
est” (ibid.) governed by “the law of reason” (ibid.) which permits us to give meaning 
and force to the idea of cosmopolitan universality, instead of seeking refuge in cul-
tural provinciality. It is not as members of an ethnic community but as members of a 
common humanity that we have risen above the immediate determinacy of natural 
history. It is through the moral anatomy of practical rationality that we have learned 
to identify with the cause of humanity. There are good reasons to rely on reason. 
When we are inclined to reason we have a reason to decline to be inclined.
17 Ibid., pp. 199-200 (Habermas quotes Kant from: Kant, “Metaphysik der Sitten,“ Werke, 4:101).
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7. univerSality and contingency
 The relationship between universality and contingency is of fundamental impor-
tance to the theoretical programme of discourse ethics, for every critical discourse 
which is concerned with the constitution of morality needs to grapple with the ques-
tion of the normative scope of its own validity. To be sure, the validity of discursively 
negotiated morality is impregnated with existential ambiguity: even when we think 
in terms of a common humanity we belong to a particular society, and even when 
we think in terms of a particular society we belong to a common humanity. For ana-
lytical purposes, we can distinguish three different levels on which to examine the 
relationship between universality and contingency in terms of a discourse-theoretic 
conception of normativity: first, the anthropological level; second, the moral level; and, 
third, the politico-normative level.
 First, on the anthropological level, the relationship between universality and 
contingency refers to the link between context-transcending interests and context-
embedded interests, or—put differently—between human interests and social in-
terests. Human interests are universal in that they are, at least in principle, shared 
by all subjects and all societies. Thus, the universal significance of human interests 
derives from the fact that they transcend the socio-historical specificity of spatiotem-
porally situated actors. Social interests, by contrast, are contingent in that they are, 
at least in practice, shared by some subjects and by some societies, but not by all of 
them. Hence, the contingent significance of social interests derives from the fact that 
they depend on the socio-historical specificity of spatiotemporally situated actors. 
The anthropological condition of universality emanates from our human interest in 
context-transcendence. The anthropological condition of contingency, on the other 
hand, stems from our social interest in context-immanence. The species-constitutive 
quest for emancipation can only be conceived of in terms of human universality if 
one seeks to rise above the provincial nature of social contingency. “Even if one ad-
mits that inherent within reason is also partisanship in favor of reason, still the claim 
to universality, which reflection as knowledge must take, is not to be reconciled with 
the particularity which must adhere to every interest, even that which aims at self-lib-
eration” (Habermas 1988 [1971]: 15; italics added). As an idiosyncratic force which is 
unique to the human condition, reason is a species-distinctive feature. As an omnipres-
ent force which is fundamental to the human condition, reason is a species-constitutive 
feature. And, as a historical force which is conducive to the human condition, reason is 
a species-generative feature. In short, as reason-giving entities we are caught up in the 
species-unifying universality of human rationality.
 Second, on the moral level, the relationship between universality and contingency 
concerns the link between context-transcending ethics and context-embedded ethics. 
As elucidated above, it is not moral feeling but moral reasoning which allows us to 
ground our judgements in a global perspective as members of humanity, rather than 
in a local perspective as members of a particular society. Thus, the “basis of universal 
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duties” (Rorty 1994: 976) is to be found not in the realm of empirical contingency but 
in the realm of rational universality. For in order to transcend the constraints imposed 
upon us by our spatiotemporal determinacy we need to seize the freedom obtainable 
through the empowering resource of our rational sovereignty. According to Haber-
mas’s discourse ethics, the moral point of view is an ethical perspective which strives 
for the universality, rather than the contingency, of norms and values. “Discourse eth-
ics intends to situate ethical subjects in a strictly moral point of view, so that they are 
able to address issues that can be judged by criterion of justice, as opposed to issues 
that can be evaluated on the basis of subjective, small group or cultural preferences” 
(Milley 2002: 57). The normative strength of a discourse-theoretic “conception of jus-
tice (moral validity) with context-transcending power” (Cooke 2005: 395; italics added) 
is that it permits us “to avoid epistemological and ethical authoritarianism” (ibid.) 
from above and instead make a case for epistemological and ethical universalism from 
below: our orientation towards ethical universality emanates from our orientation to-
wards linguistic intelligibility. We have learned to attribute social value to morality 
by engaging in the coexistential exercise of mutual comprehensibility.
 Third, on the politico-normative level, the relationship between universality and 
contingency is about the link between context-transcending norms and context-
embedded norms. The discourse-ethical ideal of the communicative search for 
normative universality manifests itself in the U-principle, i.e. the principle of uni-
versalisability. “Discourse ethics rests on the intuition that the application of the 
principle of universalization, properly understood, calls for a joint process of ‘ideal role 
taking’”(Habermas 1995: 117; italics added).18 In fact, our engagement in ideal role 
taking reflects our capacity to immerse ourselves in the coexistential exercise of pro-
jecting ourselves into the situation of others:
Under the pragmatic presuppositions of an inclusive and noncoercive rational 
discourse among free and equal participants, everyone is required to take the 
perspective of everyone else, and thus project herself into the understandings of self 
and world of all others; from this interlocking of perspectives there emerges an 
ideally extended we-perspective from which all can test in common whether 
they wish to make a controversial norm the basis of their shared practice; and 
this should include mutual criticism of the appropriateness of the languages in 
terms of which situations and needs are interpreted. (Ibid.; italics added.)
 Hence, the normative exercise of perspective-taking is paradoxical in that it re-
flects the centrality of both contingency and universality: the centrality of contin-
gency because the perspective of every individual actor is marked by its own spa-
tiotemporal determinacy, and the centrality of universality because the perspective 
of every individual actor can transcend itself through its own projectability. In brief, 
18 See also ibid.: “Discourse ethics…views the moral point of view as embodied in an intersubjective 
practice of argumentation which enjoys those involved to an idealizing enlargement of their interpretive 
perspectives.” (Italics in original.)
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discourse ethics is not a contextualist ethics but a universalist ethics. As such, it re-
minds us of the fact that “accountability…generally consists in the actor’s capacity to 
orient his or her actions in terms of validity claims.”19 Our constant exposure to the 
linguistic search for validity is indicative of our existential enclosure in an ethical 
search for universality.
8. ideal SPeech and diStorted SPeech
 The relationship between the “ideal speech situation”20 and “systematically dis-
torted communication” (Habermas 2001 [1984c]) describes another key binary dis-
tinction in Habermas’s discourse ethics. Whereas the former concept reflects Haber-
mas’s belief in the necessity and possibility of social emancipation, the latter lies at the 
centre of Habermas’s concern with the reality and complexity of social domination. 
Both concepts have been extensively discussed in the literature.21 The various forms 
of examination of these two concepts illustrate their far-reaching significance for 
Habermas’s communication-theoretic approach to the social. Indeed, any approach 
that claims to stand in the tradition of critical theory needs to provide conceptual 
tools which allow us to distinguish between emancipatory and repressive forms of 
social life. Just as the ideal speech situation epitomises the construction of an em-
powering life form whose existence allows for the realisation of our communicative 
potentials, systematically distorted communication is indicative of the consolidation 
of a disempowering life form whose existence depends on the instrumentalisation of 
our communicative potentials.
 It would be pointless to imagine the possibility of an ideal speech situation if we 
did not have to confront the ubiquity of the real speech situation. The whole point 
of identifying the empowering conditions of ideal speech oriented towards mutual 
comprehension is to criticise the disempowering effects of real speech founded on 
surreptitious distortion. In the ideal speech situation, “communication is impeded 
19 Habermas (2001a: 27; italics added; my translation). Original text in German: “Zurechnungsfähig-
keit...besteht allgemein in der Fähigkeit eines Aktors, sein Handeln an Geltungsansprüchen zu orien-
tieren.”
20 See, for example, Habermas (2001 [1984a]: 85-86, 93, 97-99 and 102-103).
21 On the concept of the ideal speech situation, see, for example: Apel (1990 [1985]: 24-25, 33-35 and 42-
51); Benhabib (1990a: 330-331, 343-345); Bernstein (1995: 47-57); Böhler (1990 [1982]: 114, 132-133, 136); 
Cooke (1993: 253; Cooke 1994: 31, 172n.8 and 172-173n.9; Cooke 1997: 9-13; Cooke 2004); Davey (1985: 
113-114, 120); Factor & Turner (1977: 194, 196, 201-201); Ferrara (1987: 44-45); Fultner (2001: xv-xvi); 
Gamwell (1997: 37); Geuss (1981: 65-75); Günther (1998: 235-236); Jay Kilby (2004: 308); Koczanowicz 
(1999: 57); Matustik (1989: 159, 166-167); McCarthy (1973: 145-148); Mendelson (1979: 71-73); Milley 
(2002: 58); Mitchell (2003: 7); Ray (2004: 309, 315-317); Susen (2009: 81-82, 93-99); Trautsch (2004: 183). 
On the concept of systematically distorted communication, see, for example: Abbas & McLean (2003: 71); 
Bernstein (1995: 44-47); Bohman (1986: 332-333, 336-344; Bohman 2000); Borradori (2003: 35); Crossley 
(2004: 89-89, 109); eEdgar (2005: 153-157); Fultner (2001: xx-xxi); Grant (2003: 14); Hesse (1980: 215); Jay 
Kilby (2004: 308); Mitchell (2003: 8); Müller-Doohm (2000: 88, 92-94); Poupeau (2000: 73); Pusey (1987: 
69-75); Sintomer (1999); Steinhoff (2001: 333-343); Susen (2009: 81-82, 99-105); Thompson (1981: 94-95).
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neither by external contingent forces nor, more importantly, by constraints arising 
from the structure of communication itself. The ideal speech situation excludes sys-
tematic distortion of communication” (Habermas 2001 [1984a]: 97). In systematically 
distorted communication, by contrast, communication is hindered by constraints 
either exogenous or endogenous to language. Systematically distorted communica-
tion, therefore, excludes genuine realisation of communication. 
 To be sure, the importance of the ideal speech situation is due to its significance 
for the challenge of social emancipation. According to Habermas’s communication-
theoretic account of society, the utopian character of human existence is not a wish-
ful fantasy, but it is built into the very structure of language. If “in every discourse 
we are mutually required to presuppose an ideal speech situation” (ibid.: 97), then 
in every linguistic effort to reach an understanding we are mutually required to 
presuppose an ideal communication. Put differently, as long as the communicative 
core of language is with us, the discursive heart of the ideal speech situation will be 
part of our existence. The presupposition that the ideal speech situation reveals the 
empowering nature of a linguistically coordinated form of coexistence is based on 
the following assumptions:
(i)  our communicative orientation towards mutual understanding anticipates 
our discursive orientation towards mutual agreement;
(ii)  just as we can distinguish between genuine and deceptive forms of under-
standing, we can differentiate between genuine and deceptive forms of 
agreement;
(iii) whereas deceptive forms of agreement are brought about by constraints 
exogenous or endogenous to language, genuine forms of agreement de-
rive solely from the unforced force of the better argument;
(iv) communication that is genuinely free from endogenous and exogenous 
constraints presupposes the symmetrical distribution of chances to choose 
and use constative, regulative, expressive, and communicative speech 
acts; and
(v)  only a situation in which the symmetrical distribution of chances is guar-
anteed can be legitimately characterised as an ideal speech situation (cf. 
Thompson 1982: 128).22
 In brief, the ideal speech situation can be described as a communicative condition 
which permits the speakers to reach a genuine agreement by virtue of the force of the 
better argument based on a symmetrical distribution of opportunities to choose and 
22 On Habermas’s concept of the ideal speech situation, see also, for example: Habermas (1988 [1963]: 279, 
281); Habermas (1970: 367, 371-374); Habermas (1988 [1971]: 17); Habermas (1987 [1981a]: 42); Haber-
mas (1990 [1983]: 86-94); Habermas (2001 [1984a]: 85-86, 93, 97-99, 102-103); Habermas (1987 [1985b]: 
323]; Habermas (1993 [1990: 163-165]); Habermas (1993 [1991b]: 54-57); Habermas (1996 [1992b]: 322-
323); Habermas (1995: 117); Habermas (2001a: 7-8, 10-13, 23, 29, 37, 42, 45-47, 52, 83-84); Habermas 
(2004a: 875).
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utter speech acts. Habermas’s concept of the ideal speech situation is crucial in that 
it serves as a normative yardstick for assessing the constitution of communicative 
relations: indeed, only if we succeed in identifying the necessary conditions of the 
counterfactual non-distortion of language can we uncover the constitutive conditions 
of the factual distortion of language. In essence, systematically distorted communica-
tion is a form of systematically disrupted speech: 
Communication can be systematically distorted only if the internal organi-
zation of speech is disrupted. This happens if the validity basis of linguistic 
communication is curtailed surreptitiously; that is, without leading to a break 
in communication or to the transition to openly declared and permissible stra-
tegic action. The validity basis of speech is curtailed surreptitiously if at least 
one of the three universal validity claims…is violated and communication 
nonetheless continues on the presumption of communicative (not strategic) ac-
tion oriented toward reaching mutual understanding (Habermas (2001 [1984]: 
154-155; italics in original).23
 The importance of systematically distorted communication is due to its signifi-
cance for the challenge of social domination. Following Habermas’s communica-
tion-theoretic account of society, the repressive potential of human existence is not a 
fatalistic fantasy of immeasurable scope, but it is a substantive reality whose damag-
ing power manifests itself in the dysfunctional use of language: if “communication 
pathologies can be conceived of as the result of a confusion between actions oriented 
to reaching understanding and actions oriented to success” (Habermas 1987 [1981c]: 
332, italics added), then in every linguistic effort to engage in communicative action 
whilst actually engaging in strategic action we are fully immersed in the production 
of systematically distorted communication. Put differently, as long as the strategic 
use of language will be with us, the disruptive nature of systematically distorted 
communication will be part of our existence. The presupposition that systematically 
distorted communication epitomises the disempowering nature of strategically co-
ordinated forms of interaction is based on the following assumptions:
(i)  our strategic orientation towards success anticipates our distortive orien-
tation towards mutual deception;
(ii)  just as we can distinguish between open and surreptitious forms of strategic 
action, we can differentiate between open and surreptitious forms of strate-
gic language use;
(iii) whereas open forms of strategic language use presuppose that every 
speech partner involved in the communication process is aware of the stra-
tegic nature of language use, surreptitious forms of strategic language use 
23 On Habermas’s concept of systematically distorted communication, see also, for example: Habermas 
(1970: 374); Habermas (1988 [1971]: 16, 24); Habermas (1987 [1981c]: 332-333); Habermas (1987 [1981d]: 
134, 141-143, 148); Habermas (2001 [1984a]: 99); Habermas (2001 [1984c]: 129-170); Habermas (2000ª: 
15-18).
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presuppose that at least one speech partner involved in the communica-
tion process is unaware of the strategic nature of language use;
(iv) communication that is genuinely deformed by the surreptitious endorse-
ment of strategic action presupposes the asymmetrical distribution of chances 
to choose and use constative, regulative, expressive, and communicative 
speech acts; and
(v)  a situation in which the asymmetrical distribution of chances impinges 
upon the communicative nature of a conversational encounter can be le-
gitimately characterised as systematically distorted communication.
 In short, systematically distorted communication can be described as an interac-
tional condition which permits the speakers to reach a deceptive agreement by virtue 
of the force of strategic action based on an asymmetrical distribution of opportuni-
ties to choose and utter speech acts. Habermas’s concept of systematically distorted 
communication is central in that it serves as a normative yardstick for criticising the 
deformation of communicative relations: in fact, only if we succeed in uncovering 
the detrimental effects of the factual distortion of language can we appreciate the nor-
mative value of the counterfactual non-distortion of language.
 Systematically distorted communication can be considered as the antithesis of 
the ideal speech situation, because the constitutive conditions of the former violate 
the normative presuppositions of the latter. The differentiation between these two 
scenarios represents another binary conceptual distinction at the heart of Haber-
mas’s discourse ethics: empowering discourses are guided by the collective search for 
validity established through the engagement in communicative action; disempowering 
discourses, on the other hand, are guided by the collective search for validity estab-
lished through the engagement in deceptive action. If social legitimacy depends on 
communicative validity, society succeeds in making the course of its history contin-
gent upon the empowering force of linguistically achieved maturity. If, by contrast, 
social legitimacy depends on deceptive validity, society ends up making the course of 
its destiny parasitical upon the disempowering force of strategically oriented instru-
mentality. Just as every subject capable of speech and action is not only a subject capa-
ble of speech and reflection but also a subject capable of speech and deception, every society 
capable of development and direction is not only a society capable of development and 
emancipation but also a society capable of development and domination. The gulf between 
communicatively and strategically motivated forms of linguisticality anticipates the 
normative gap between empowering and disempowering forms of society.
9. Secularity and religioSity
 Another crucial binary division in Habermas’s discourse ethics is the conceptual 
distinction between secular and religious types of discourse. Following Habermas, 
secular discourses are fundamentally different from religious discourses in that the 
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latter remain trapped in metaphysical parameters of validity based on faith and im-
agination whereas the former are subject to postmetaphysical parameters of valid-
ity founded on reason and argumentation. In other words, whilst religious discourses 
ground their claims to validity in the transcendental grammar of sacred spirituality, 
secular discourses ground their claims to validity in the quasi-transcendental pragmat-
ics of communicative rationality. 
 To be sure, the distinction between the metaphysical defence of faith and the 
postmetaphysical defence of reason is not always clear-cut: just as religious dis-
courses can express a faith in reason, secular discourses can provide reasons for 
faith. It is one of the major challenges of the philosophical discourse of modernity 
(Habermas 1987 [1985a]) to explore both the emancipatory and the repressive poten-
tials of the historical intertwinement of faith and reason. If the truthfulness of truth is 
entangled with the faithfulness of faith, then the reasonability of reason is entwined 
with the believability of belief. The secular subject has come to believe in the defence 
of reason just as the religious subject has come to reason in defence of faith. Believ-
ing reason and reasoning faith are two mutually inclusive elements of the modern 
condition. Indeed, religious spirituality and secular rationality are two coexisting 
cornerstones of the modern condition. The philosophical task of discourse ethics is 
to make sense of the normative challenges which arise from the interplay between 
faith and reason.
 The relationship between reason and faith is far from straightforward. As mutu-
ally opposing forces, they can contradict each other; as mutually balancing forces, they 
can complement each other. Put differently, although reason and faith do not neces-
sarily contradict each other, they are not always reconcilable, and although reason 
and faith can be reconciled with one another, they are often contradictory. Given 
its commitment to the forceless force of reason and given its suspicion towards the 
arbitrary force of faith, discourse ethics seeks to rely on the falsifiable validity of 
communicative rationality, rather than on the non-falsifiable legitimacy of religious 
spirituality. Religiously motivated claims to validity might be utterly sincere, but 
this does not make them true or right. Religiously inspired claims to sincerity are 
no guarantee of rationally justifiable claims to validity: in order to claim universal 
validity, our linguistic orientation towards truth, rightness, sincerity, and compre-
hensibility must strive for rational justifiability, rather than for wishful spirituality. 
In the realm of discourse ethics, it is not the gullibility of a religious imaginary but 
the authority of critical rationality which decides over the defensibility of linguisti-
cally evoked claims to validity.
 If “churches in modern societies” (Habermas 1992b: 229) can be regarded as 
“communities of interpretation” (ibid.), rational discourses in modern societies can 
be considered as linguistic provinces of critical reflection. Surely, neither religious 
nor secular discourses can claim to transcend the contingency of their own socio-
historical determinacy. Notwithstanding whether they conceive of themselves as re-
ligious or secular, all subjects capable of speech and action can only draw upon prov-
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inces of linguistic signification insofar as they are socialised into communities of 
interpretation. A socialising subject needs a socialising community, a speaker needs 
a speech community, and an interpreter needs a community of interpretation.
 Discourse ethics takes issue with religious forms of interpretation in that their 
ritualised claim to spirituality give the impression that they rise above the critical 
force of communicative rationality. Yet, given that “[r]eligious discourse is closely 
joined to a ritual praxis that, in comparison with profane everyday praxis, is lim-
ited in the degree of its freedom of communication…, it could be said that faith is 
protected against a radical problematisation by its being rooted in cult” (Habermas 
1992b: 233). Hence, whereas in secular discourses the radical problematisation of 
validity claims constitutes a civilisational objective, in religious discourses the radical 
problematisation of validity claims represents an uncomfortable obstacle. The whole 
point of secular discourses is to measure the contingency of their own legitimacy 
against the rationality of discursive validity. The mission of religious discourses, by 
contrast, is to assert the universality of their own legitimacy through the rituality of 
ceremonial validity. Just as, under the conditions of secular discourse, it is not ac-
ceptable to hide behind the concept of the Unconditional, “under the conditions of 
postmetaphysical thinking, it is not enough to take shelter behind a concept of the 
Absolute” (ibid.: 227). Under conditions of radical critique, critique becomes a radi-
cal condition. 
 It is the task of discourse ethics to convert critique into the normative corner-
stone of our discursive problematisation of the world. Within Habermas’s tripartite 
conception of language, “[t]his problematisation unavoidably occurs when the ontic, 
normative, and expressive aspects of validity, which must remain fused together in 
the conceptions of the creator and redeemer God, of theodicy, and of the event of sal-
vation, are separated analytically from one another” (ibid.: 233). The postmetaphysi-
cal problematisation of the world is founded on the analytical differentiation between 
the constative, normative, and expressive dimensions of language; by contrast, the 
religious problematisation of the world is based on their fusion. If the rationalisation 
of the lifeworld is to take precedence over the mystification of the lifeworld, then 
the critical negotiation of linguistic validity needs to take priority over the arbitrary 
imposition of social legitimacy. Under postmetaphysical conditions, discourse needs 
to distrust religious belief if it seeks to provide rational, rather than metaphysical, 
grounds for the validity of its own legitimacy. The power of discourse depends on its 
capacity to make the conditions of its own possibility the subject of critical scrutiny.
10. intuitiveneSS and reflexiveneSS
 Another crucial binary division in Habermas’s discourse ethics is the conceptual 
distinction between intuition and reflection. Subjects capable of speech and action 
are able to draw on both intuitive and reflective knowledge. If we recognise that we 
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are both world-intuitive and world-reflective actors, then we need to acknowledge that 
our communicative engagement with the world is a deeply paradoxical affair: on the 
one hand, linguistic actors are able to raise validity claims intuitively and unreflective-
ly; on the other hand, linguistic actors are able to raise validity claims discursively and 
reflectively. In the former case, we engage in communicative action; in the latter case, 
we engage in discursive action. In the former scenario, the “pretheoretical knowl-
edge of competent speakers” (Habermas 1987 [1981c]: 286) permits us to interact on 
the basis of taken-for-granted and non-problematised background assumptions; in 
the latter scenario, the “potential for critique built into communicative action itself” 
(Habermas 1987 [1981b]: 121) enables us to bring the taken-for-granted assumptions 
of the unreflexive background to the reflexive foreground. 
 To be sure, the empowering nature of our communicative competence manifests 
itself both in our intuitive competence and in our reflexive competence: as an interac-
tive competence, our communicative competence allows us to engage in linguistic 
interaction with our human fellows by raising and exchanging validity claims in-
tuitively; as a reflexive competence, our communicative competence permits us to 
problematise the validity claims raised and exchanged in linguistic interactions with 
our human fellows by scrutinising and questioning validity claims critically.
 The ambivalence of this condition is reflected in the fact that Habermasian ethics 
is generally referred to—by Habermas himself as well as by his hostile and sym-
pathetic critics—both as “communicative ethics”24 and as “discourse ethics.”25 The 
concept of “communicative ethics” suggests that an ethics can be based upon the 
communicative features of social life, just as the concept of “discourse ethics” implies 
that an ethics can be founded upon the discursive features of social life. In the former 
case, the emphasis is put on our coordinative capacity to engage in communicative 
action: the normativity established in a given society is contingent upon its mem-
bers’ engagement in the communicative search for mutual intelligibility. In the latter 
case, the accent is put on our contemplative capacity to engage in discursive action: 
the normativity established in a given society is dependent upon its members’ en-
gagement in the discursive search for rational defensibility. An ethics which relies on 
our communicative capacity for the construction of normativity constitutes a philo-
sophical framework which locates the practical grounds of morality in the coordina-
tive grounds of linguisticality: mutual comprehension. An ethics which draws on our 
discursive capacity for the construction of normativity constitutes a philosophical 
framework which locates the theoretical grounds of morality in the contemplative 
grounds of linguisticality: rational reflection.
24 See, for example: Benhabib (1990a, 1990b); Benhabib & Dallmayr (1990); Delruelle (1993: 69); Funiok 
(1996); Gamwell (1997); Habermas (2001 [1990]: 75); McNay (2003); Prieto Navarro (2003: 221-235); 
Thompson (2000).
25 See, for example: Apel (1996); Finlayson (2000); Garvey (2000); Gilabert (2005); Haber (2003); Hab-
ermas (1990 [1983]); Habermas (1986 [1990]); Habermas (2001 [1990]); Habermas (1993 [1991]-a); 
Habermas (1993 [1991b]; Habermas (1996 [1992]-a), pp. 171, 280-281, 283, 285, 319-320, 333-334, and 
340; Hutchings (2005); Lafont (2005); Prieto Navarro (2003: 221-235); Schweppenhäuser (1989); White 
(1994).
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 Given its simultaneous emphasis on the communicative and discursive grounds 
of normativity, discourse ethics stresses the species-constitutive significance of both 
our background and our foreground knowledge for the very possibility of society. 
Whereas our background knowledge serves the integrative function of maintaining the 
legitimacy of the social conditions to which we are exposed when we find ourselves 
immersed in our lifeworlds, our foreground knowledge fulfils the reflective function 
of questioning the legitimacy of these conditions. For “the moment this background 
knowledge enters communicative expression, where it becomes explicit knowledge 
and thereby subject to criticism, it loses precisely those characteristics which life-
world structures always have for those who belong to them: certainty, background 
character, impossibility of being gone behind” (Habermas 1986 [1981]: 110).26 The hid-
den orthodoxy of everyday taken-for-grantedness can be challenged by the open het-
erodoxy of sporadic discursiveness. The certainty of common sense manifests itself 
in the commonality of certainty. It is common to believe that what we believe is true 
because it is certain that we live our life as what we have to live through.
 Habermasian ethics—insofar as it is understood as both a communicative ethics 
and a discourse ethics—reminds us of the deep ambivalence of the knowledgeable 
self: as knowledgeable selves, we rely on both intuitive and reflexive, practical and 
theoretical, implicit and explicit, unproblematised and problematised, taken-for-
granted and to-be-made-a-case-for knowledge. Both forms of knowledge are spe-
cies-constitutive illustrating that human forms of action within the world cannot be 
dissociated from human forms of cognition about the world. As an active species, we 
make the world; and, as a cognitive species, we contemplate the world. To be sure, to 
recognise that “the actor becomes conscious of his subjectivity at the moment when 
his habitualized performance of an action is disturbed” (Habermas 1992 [1988]: 173-
174) means to acknowledge that the habituality of our actions can become a subject 
of scrutiny when reflected upon by virtue of our critical rationality. Just as the habit-
ualised patterns of social action can be converted into an object of reflective contem-
plation, the habitualised validity of social normativity can be questioned through 
the coexistential exercise of discursive argumentation. 
 It is through the structure of our language that we have learned to reflect upon 
the structure of our actions. “From the structure of language comes the explanation 
of why the human spirit is condemned to an odyssey—why it first finds its way to 
itself only on a detour via a complete externalization in other things and in other 
humans. Only at the greatest distance from itself does it become conscious of itself 
in its irreplaceable singularity as an individuated being (Wesen)” (ibid.: 153). Just as 
our immersion in the world is made possible through our daily reliance on intui-
tive knowledge, which provides us with a sense of habituality when exploiting the 
absorbability of reality through the mediating experience of society, our distancia-
tion from the world is made possible through our occasional reliance on reflexive 
26 On this point, see also Myles (2004: 103).
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knowledge, which imbues us with a sense of criticality when turning the reality 
of absorbability into a mediating experience of linguisticality. Discourse ethics de-
mands nothing but our awareness of both the intuitive and the reflexive nature of 
our cognitive existence. As intuitive entities, we are capable of immersion; as reflexive 
entities, we are capable of distanciation; and, as discourse-ethical entities, we are ca-
pable of distancing ourselves from intuitive immersion by immersing ourselves in 
reflexive distanciation.
concluSionS
 The foregoing analysis has sought to shed light on the philosophical significance 
of binary categories in Habermas’s discourse ethics. As demonstrated above, the 
following binary distinctions are central to the philosophical programme associated 
with Habermas’s discourse ethics: (1) theory and practice, (2) monologue and dialogue, 
(3) privacy and publicity, (4) violence and discourse, (5) autonomy and heteronomy, (6) rea-
son and inclination, (7) universality and contingency, (8) ideal speech and distorted speech, 
(9) secularity and religiosity, and (10) intuitiveness and reflexiveness. The critical analysis 
of these binary distinctions is fundamental to a fine-grained understanding of the 
various conceptual tensions that lie at the heart of Habermas’s discourse ethics. Both 
the theoretical complexity and the empirical relevance of these tensions are symp-
tomatic of the far-reaching philosophical significance of binary categories for the 
construction of Habermas’s discourse ethics. The main insights to be gained from 
the previous analysis of these binary categories can be synthesised as follows.
1.  Just as we have a theoretical interest in the discursive problematisation 
of the world, we have a practical interest in the social transformation of 
the world (theory and practice).
2. In order to be truly discursive and genuinely ethical, a discourse ethics 
needs to be oriented towards and constructed through dialogue, rather 
than monologue (monologue and dialogue).
3. The prevalence of the public over the private is due to the preponder-
ance of the social over the individual (privacy and publicity).
4. The maturity of humanity depends on its capacity to determine its des-
tiny by virtue of discursive rationality, rather than violent instrumen-
tality (violence and discourse).
5. The construction of individual autonomy is unthinkable without the 
reproduction of social heteronomy (autonomy and heteronomy).
6. Reasonable entities are inclined to reason (reason and inclination).
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7. If as members of a common humanity we are oriented towards moral 
universality, as members of a particular society we are oriented towards 
moral contingency (universality and contingency).
8. The ideal speech situation is an unavoidable condition of the real speech 
situation (ideal speech and distorted speech).
9. Unlike religious discourses, secular discourses need to provide ration-
al, rather than metaphysical, grounds for the validity of their own le-
gitimacy (secularity and religiosity).
10. To the extent that—as intuitive entities—we are capable of immersion 
and—as reflexive ones—we are capable of distanciation, we are—as 
discourse-ethical entities—capable of both reflexive immersion and im-
mersive distanciation (intuitiveness and reflexiveness). 
referenceS
Abbas, Andrea and Monica McLean. 2003. “Communicative Competence and the Improve-
ment of University Teaching: Insights from the Field,” British Journal of Sociology of Educa-
tion 24, 1: 69-81.
Alexy, Robert. 1998. “Jürgen Habermas’s Theory of Legal Discourse.” Pp. 226-233 in Michel 
Rosenfeld and Andrew Arato (eds.), Habermas on Law and Democracy: Critical Exchanges. 
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Apel, Karl-Otto. 1990 [1985]. “Is the Ethics of the Ideal Communication Community a 
Utopia? On the Relationship between Ethics, Utopia, and the Critique of Utopia.” Pp. 23-
59 in Seyla Benhabib and Fred R. Dallmayr (eds.), The Communicative Ethics Controversy. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
_____. 1996. “’Discourse Ethics’ before the Challenge of ‘Liberation Philosophy,’” Philosophy 
& Social Criticism 22, 2: 1-25.
Benhabib, Seyla. 1990a. “Afterword: Communicative Ethics and Contemporary Controversies 
in Practical Philosophy.” Pp. 330-369 in Seyla Benhabib and Fred R. Dallmayr (eds.), The 
Communicative Ethics Controversy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
_____. 1990b. “In the Shadow of Aristotle and Hegel: Communicative Ethics and Current 
Controversies in Practical Philosophy.” Pp. 1-31 in Michael Kelly (ed.), Hermeneutics and 
Critical Theory in Ethics and Politics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
_____., and Fred R. Dallmayr (eds.). 1990. The Communicative Ethics Controversy. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press.
Bernstein, Richard J. M. 1995. Recovering Ethical Life: Jürgen Habermas and the Future of Critical 
Theory. London: Routledge.
Blanke, Thomas. 1991. “Versprachlichung: Aspekte zum zeitdiagnostischen Gehalt von 
Jürgen Habermas’ Diskurs der Moderne.“ Pp. 175-195 in Stefan Müller-Doohm (ed.), 
Jenseits der Utopie, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Böhler, Dietrich. 1990 [1982]. “Transcendental Pragmatics and Critical Morality: On the 
Possibility and Moral Significance of a Self-Enlightenment of Reason.” Pp. 111-150 
in Seyla Benhabib and Fred R. Dallmayr (eds.), The Communicative Ethics Controversy, 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Sociological Analysis120
Simon Susen
Bohman, James. 1986. “Formal Pragmatics and Social Criticism: The Philosophy of Language 
and the Critique of Ideology in Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action,” Philosophy 
& Social Criticism 12, 4: 331-352.
_____. 2000. “Distorted Communication: Formal Pragmatics as a Critical Theory.” Pp. 3-20 
in Lewis Edwin Hahn (ed.), Perspectives on Habermas. Chicago & La Salle, IL: Open 
Court.
Borradori, Giovanna. 2003. Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and 
Jacques Derrida. Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press.
Calhoun, Craig. 1992. “Introduction: Habermas and the Public Sphere.” Pp. 1-48 in Craig 
Calhoun (ed.), Habermas and the Public Sphere. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Cooke, Maeve. 1993. “Habermas and Consensus,” European Journal of Philosophy 1, 3: 247-
267.
_____. 1994. Language and Reason: A Study of Habermas’s Pragmatics. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
_____. 1997. “Are Ethical Conflicts Irreconcilable?” Philosophy & Social Criticism 23, 2: 1-19.
_____. 2004 “Redeeming Redemption: The Utopian Dimension of Critical Social Theory,” 
Philosophy & Social Criticism 30, 4: 413-429.
_____. 2005. “Avoiding Authoritarianism: On the Problem of Justification in Contemporary 
Critical Social Theory,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13, 3: 379-404.
Crossley, Nick. 2004. “On Systematically Distorted Communication: Bourdieu and the Socio-
Analysis of Publics.” Pp. 88-112 in Nick Crossley and John Michael Roberts (eds.), After 
Habermas: New Perspectives on the Public Sphere. Oxford: Blackwell/Sociological Review.
_____., and John Michael Roberts (eds.). 2004. After Habermas: New Perspectives on the Public 
Sphere. Oxford: Blackwell/Sociological Review.
Davey, Nicholas. 1985. “Habermas’s Contribution to Hermeneutic Theory,” Journal of the 
British Society for Phenomenology 16, 2: 109-131.
Delruelle, Édouard. 1993. Le consensus impossible: le différend entre éthique et politique chez H. 
Arendt et J. Habermas. Bruxelles: Ousia.
Edgar, Andrew. 2005. The Philosophy of Habermas. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. 
Factor, Regis A., and Stephen P. Turner. 1977. “The Critique of Positivist Social Science in Leo 
Strauss and Jürgen Habermas,” Sociological Analysis & Theory 7, 3: 185-206.
Ferrara, Alessandro. 1987. “A Critique of Habermas’s Consensus Theory of Truth,” Philosophy 
& Social Criticism 13: 39-67.
Finlayson, James Gordon. 2000. “Modernity and Morality in Habermas’s Discourse Ethics,” 
Inquiry 43: 319-340.
Fraser, Nancy. 1992. “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually 
Existing Democracy,” in Craig Calhoun (ed.), Habermas and the Public Sphere. Cambridge, 
Mass: MIT Press pp. 109-142. 
Fultner, Barbara. 2001. “Translator’s Introduction.” Pp. vii-xxiv in Jürgen Habermas, On the 
Pragmatics of Social Interaction: Preliminary Studies in the Theory of Communicative Action, 
trans. Barbara Fultner, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Funiok, Rüdiger. (ed.). 1996. Grundfragen der Kommunikationsethik. Konstanz: Ölschläger/UVK.
Gamwell, Franklin I. 1997. “Habermas and Apel on Communicative Ethics: Their Difference 
and the Difference it Makes,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 23, 2: 21-45.
Garvey, T. Gregory. 2000. “The Value of Opacity: A Bakhtinian Analysis of Habermas’s 
Discourse Ethics,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 33, 4: 370-390.
Geuss, Raymond. 1981. The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
_____. 2001. Public Goods, Private Goods. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.
Gilabert, Pablo. 2005. “A Substantivist Construal of Discourse Ethics,” International Journal of 
Volume 3, Number 2, Autumn 2009 121
Binary Categories in Habermas’s Discourse Ethics
Philosophical Studies 13, 3: 405-437.
Goodnight, Thomas G. 1992. “Habermas, the Public Sphere, and Controversy,” International 
Journal of Public Opinion 4, 3: 243-255.
Grant, Colin B. 2003. “Rethinking Communicative Interaction: An Interdisciplinary 
Programme.” Pp. 1-26 in Colin B. Grant (ed.), Rethinking Communicative Interaction: New 
Interdisciplinary Horizons. Amsterdam: J. Benjamins.
Greig, Mary. 2004. “Habermas and the Holy Grail of Reason: The Philosophical Discourse of 
Modernity between Theatre and Theory,” Social Semiotics 14, 2: 215-232.
Günther, Klaus. 1998. “Communicative Freedom, Communicative Power, and Jurisgenesis.” 
Pp. 234-254 in Michel Rosenfeld and Andrew Arato (eds.), Habermas on Law and Democracy: 
Critical Exchanges. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
Haber, Stéphane. 2003. “Éthique de la discussion et réconciliation avec la nature. ” Pp. 219-
233 in Emmanuel Renault & Yves Sintomer (eds.), Où en est la théorie critique?. Paris: La 
Découverte.
Habermas, Jürgen. 1970. “Towards a Theory of Communicative Competence,” Inquiry 13, 4: 
360-375.
_____. 1971 [1968]. “Technology and Science as ‘Ideology’”. Pp. 81-122 in Jürgen Habermas, 
Toward a Rational Society: Student Protest, Science, and Politics, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro. 
London: Heinemann Educational. 
_____. 1976. “Zwei Bemerkungen zum praktischen Diskurs.“ Pp. 338-346 in Jürgen Habermas, 
Zur Rekonstruktion des Historischen Materialismus. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
_____. 1986 [1981]. “The Dialectics of Rationalization.“ Pp. 95-130 in Jürgen Habermas, 
Autonomy and Solidarity: Interviews with Jürgen Habermas, edited and introduced by Peter 
Dews. London: Verso.
_____. 1990 [1986]. “Discourse Ethics, Law and Sittlichkeit.” Pp. 245-271 in Jürgen Habermas, 
Autonomy and Solidarity: Interviews with Jürgen Habermas, edited and introduced by Peter 
Dews. London: Verso.
_____. 1987 [1968a]. “Peirce’s Logic of Inquiry: The Dilemma of a Scholastic Realism Restored 
by the Logic of Language.” Pp. 91-112 in Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, 
trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro. Cambridge: Polity Press.
_____. 1987 [1968b]. “Reason and Interest: Retrospect on Kant and Fichte.” Pp. 191-213 in 
Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro, Cambridge: 
Polity Press. 
_____. 1987 [1981a]. “‘Rationality’—A Preliminary Specification.” Pp. 8-42 in Jürgen Haber-
mas, The Theory of Communicative Action. Volume 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Soci-
ety, trans. Thomas McCarthy. Cambridge: Polity Press.
_____. 1987 [1981b]. “The Problem of Understanding Meaning in the Social Sciences.” Pp. 
102-141 in Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action. Volume 1: Reason and the 
Rationalization of Society, trans. Thomas McCarthy. Cambridge: Polity Press.
_____. 1987 [1981c]. “Intermediate Reflections: Social Action, Purposive Activity, and 
Communication.” Pp. 263-337 in Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action. 
Volume 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society, trans. Thomas McCarthy. Cambridge: 
Polity Press.
_____. 1987 [1981d]. “The Concept of the Lifeworld and the Hermeneutic Idealism of 
Interpretive Sociology.” Pp. 119-152 in Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative 
Action. Volume 2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason, trans. Thomas 
McCarthy. Cambridge: Polity Press.
_____. 1987 [1985a]. The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, trans. Frederick Lawrence. 
Cambridge: Polity Press.
_____. 1987 [1985b]. “An Alternative Way out of the Philosophy of the Subject: Communicative 
Sociological Analysis122
Simon Susen
versus Subject-Centered Reason.” Pp. 294-326 in Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical 
Discourse of Modernity, trans. Frederick Lawrence. Cambridge: Polity Press.
_____. 1988 [1963]. “Dogmatism, Reason, and Decision: On Theory and Praxis in Our 
Scientific Civilization.” Pp. 253-282 in Jürgen Habermas, Theory and Practice, trans. John 
Viertel. Cambridge: Polity Press.
_____. 1988 [1968]. “Labor and Interaction: Remarks on Hegel’s Jena Philosophy of Mind.” 
Pp. 142-169 in Jürgen Habermas, Theory and Practice, trans. John Viertel. Cambridge: 
Polity Press.
_____. 1988 [1971]. “Introduction: Some Difficulties in the Attempt to Link Theory and 
Praxis.” Pp. 1-40 in Jürgen Habermas, Theory and Practice, trans. John Viertel. Cambridge: 
Polity Press.
_____. 1989 [1962]. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category 
of Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger. Cambridge: Polity Press.
_____. 1990 [1983]. “Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification.” 
Pp. 43-115 in Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. 
Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
_____. 1992a. “Further Reflections on the Public Sphere.” Pp. 421-461 in Craig Calhoun (ed.), 
Habermas and the Public Sphere. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
_____. 1992b. “Transcendence from Within, Transcendence in this World.” Pp. 226-250 in 
Don S. Browning and Francis Schüssler Fiorenza (eds.), Habermas, Modernity and Public 
Theology. New York: Crossroad.
_____. 1992 [1988]. “Individuation through Socialization: On George Herbert Mead’s Theory 
of Subjectivity.” Pp. 149-204 in Jürgen Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical 
Essays, trans. William Mark Hohengarten. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
_____. 1993 [1990]. “Morality, Society, and Ethics: An Interview with Torben Hviid Nielsen.” 
Pp. 147-176 in Jürgen Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics, 
trans. Ciaran Cronin. Cambridge: Polity Press.
_____. 1993 [1991a]. Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics, trans. Ciaran 
Cronin. Cambridge: Polity Press.
_____. 1993 [1991b]. “Remarks on Discourse Ethics.” Pp. 19-111 in Jürgen Habermas, 
Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics, trans. Ciaran Cronin. Cambridge: 
Polity Press.
_____. 1994. “Postscript to Faktizität und Geltung,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 20, 4: 135-
150.
_____. 1995. “Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls’s 
Political Liberalism,” Journal of Philosophy 92, 3: 109-131.
_____. 1996 [1992a]. Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy, trans. William Rehg. Cambridge: Polity Press.
_____. 1996 [1992b]. “The Sociological Translation of the Concept of Deliberative Politics.” 
Pp. 315-328 in Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse 
Theory of Law and Democracy, trans. William Rehg. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
_____. 2000a. “Nach dreißig Jahren: Bemerkungen zu Erkenntnis und Interesse.“ Pp. 12-20 in 
Stefan Müller-Doohm (ed.), Das Interesse der Vernunft: Rückblicke auf das Werk von Jürgen 
Habermas seit “Erkenntnis und Interesse“. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
_____. 2000b. “From Kant to Hegel: On Robert Brandom‘s Pragmatic Philosophy of Language,” 
European Journal of Philosophy 8, 3: 322-355.
_____. 2001a. Kommunikatives Handeln und detranszendentalisierte Vernunft. Stuttgart: Reclam, 
Ditzingen.
_____. 2001b. “Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles?,” 
Political Theory 29, 6: 766-781.
Volume 3, Number 2, Autumn 2009 123
Binary Categories in Habermas’s Discourse Ethics
_____. 2001 [1984a]. “Truth and Society: The Discursive Redemption of Factual Claims to 
Validity.” Pp. 85-103 in Jürgen Habermas, On the Pragmatics of Social Interaction: Preliminary 
Studies in the Theory of Communicative Action, trans. Barbara Fultner. Cambridge: Polity 
Press. 
_____. 2001 [1984b]. “Intentions, Conventions, and Linguistic Interactions.” Pp. 105-127 in 
Jürgen Habermas, On the Pragmatics of Social Interaction: Preliminary Studies in the Theory 
of Communicative Action, trans. Barbara Fultner. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
_____. 2001 [1984c]. “Reflections on Communicative Pathology.” Pp. 129-170 in Jürgen Hab-
ermas, On the Pragmatics of Social Interaction: Preliminary Studies in the Theory of Communi-
cative Action, trans. Barbara Fultner. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
_____. 2001 [1990]. “A Master Builder with Hermeneutic Tact: The Path of the Philosopher Karl-
Otto Apel.” Pp. 66-77 in Jürgen Habermas, The Liberating Power of Symbols: Philosophical 
Essays, trans. Peter Dews. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
_____. 2004a. “Freiheit und Determinismus,“ Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 52, 6: 871-
890.
_____. 2004b. “Die Grenze zwischen Glauben und Wissen. Zur Wirkungsgeschichte and 
aktuellen Bedeutung von Kants Religionsphilosophie,“ Revue de métaphysique et de morale 
4: 460-484.
Hesse, Mary. 1980. “Habermas’s Consensus Theory of Truth.” Pp. 206-231 in Mary Hesse, 
Revolutions and Reconstructions in the Philosophy of Science. Brighton, Sussex: Harvester 
Press. 
Holub, Robert C. 1991. Jürgen Habermas: Critic in the Public Sphere. London: Routledge.
Honneth, Axel. 1991 (1986). “From the Analysis of Discourse to the Theory of Power: 
Struggle as the Paradigm of the Social.” Pp. 149-175 in Axel Honneth, The Critique of 
Power. Reflective Stages in a Critical Social Theory. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
Hudson, Wayne. 1993. “Habermas’s The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity.” Pp. 107-131 in 
Dieter Freundlieb and Wayne Hudson (eds.), Reason and Its Other: Rationality in Modern 
German Philosophy and Culture. Providence and Oxford: Berg.
Hutchings, Kimberly. 2005. “Speaking and Hearing: Habermasian Discourse Ethics, Feminism 
and IR,” Review of International Studies 31, 1: 155-165.
Jay Kilby, R. 2004. “Critical Thinking, Epistemic Virtue, and the Significance of Inclusion: 
Reflections on Harvey Siegel’s Theory of Rationality,” Educational Theory 54,3: 299-313.
Kelly, Michael (ed.). 1990. Hermeneutics and Critical Theory in Ethics and Politics. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press.
Kemp, Ray. 1985. “Planning, Public Hearings, and the Politics of Public Discourse.” Pp. 177-
201 in John Forester (ed.), Critical Theory and Public Life. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 
Koczanowicz, Leszek. 1999. “The Choice of Tradition and the Tradition of Choice: Habermas’s 
and Rorty’s interpretation of Pragmatism,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 25, 1: 55-70.
Kögler, Hans-Herbert. 2005. “Constructing a Cosmopolitan Public Sphere: Hermeneutic 
Capabilities and Universal Values,” European Journal of Social Theory 8, 3: 297-320.
Ku, Agnes S. 2000. “Revisiting the Notion of ‘Public’ in Habermas’s Theory: Toward a Theory 
of Politics of Public Credibility,” Sociological Theory 18, 2: 216-240.
Lafont, Cristina. 2005. “Universalization or Threat Advantage? The Difficult Dialogue 
between Discourse Ethics and the Theory of Rational Choice,” Dialogue 44, 2: 373-382.
Matustik, Martin J. 1989. “Habermas on Communicative Reason and Performative 
Contradiction,” New German Critique 47: 143-172.
McCarthy, Thomas. 1973. “A Theory of Communicative Competence,” Philosophy of the Social 
Sciences 3, 2: 135-156.
McNay, Lois. 2003. “Having it Both Ways: The Incompatibility of Narrative Identity and 
Communicative Ethics in Feminist Thought,” Theory, Culture & Society 20, 6: 1-20.
Sociological Analysis124
Simon Susen
Mendelson, Jack. 1979. “The Habermas-Gadamer Debate,” New German Critique 18: 44-73.
Milley, Peter. 2002. “Imagining Good Organizations: Moral Orders or Moral Communities?,” 
Educational Management Administration and Leadership 30, 1: 47-64.
Mitchell, Gordon R. 2003. “Did Habermas Cede Nature to the Positivists?,” Philosophy and 
Rhetoric 36, 1: 1-21.
Müller-Doohm, Stefan. 2000. “Kritik in kritischen Theorien. Oder: Wie kritisches Denken 
selber zu rechtfertigen sei.“ Pp. 71-106 in Stefan Müller-Doohm (ed.), Das Interesse der 
Vernunft: Rückblicke auf das Werk von Jürgen Habermas seit „Erkenntnis und Interesse“. 
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 
Myles, John F. 2004. “From Doxa to Experience: Issues in Bourdieu’s Adoption of Husserlian 
Phenomenology,” Theory, Culture & Society 21, 2: 91-107.
Nielsen, Greg Marc. 1995. “Bakhtin and Habermas: Toward a Transcultural Ethics,” Theory 
and Society 24, 6: 803-835.
O’Neill, Shane. 2000. “The Politics of Inclusive Agreements: Towards a Critical Discourse 
Theory of Democracy,” Political Studies 48, 3: 503-521.
Poupeau, Franck. 2000. “Reasons for Domination, Bourdieu versus Habermas.” Pp. 69-87 
in Bridget Fowler (ed.), Reading Bourdieu on Society and Culture. Oxford: Blackwell/ 
Sociological Review.
Prieto Navarro, Evaristo. 2003. Jürgen Habermas: acción comunicativa e identidad política. Madrid: 
Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales.
Pusey, Michael. 1987. Jürgen Habermas. London: Routledge.
Rabotnikof, Nora. 1997. El espacio público y la democracia moderna. México, D.F: Instituto 
Federal Electoral, Colección Temas de la Democracia, Serie Ensayos, Núm. 1.
Rabotnikof, Nora. 1998. “Público-Privado,” Debate Feminista Año 9, Vol. 18: 3-13.
Ray, Larry. 2004. “Pragmatism and Critical Theory,” European Journal of Social Theory 7, 3: 
307-321.
Ricoeur, Paul. 1979. Main Trends in Philosophy. New York: Holmes & Meier.
Robbins, Bruce. (ed.). 1993. The Phantom Public Sphere. Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota Press.
Rochlitz, Rainer. (ed.). 2002. Habermas: L’usage public de la raison. Paris: Presses Universitaires 
de France.
Rorty, Richard. 1994. “Sind Aussagen universelle Geltungsansprüche?,“ Deutsche Zeitschrift 
für Philosophie 42, 6: 975-988.
Schweppenhäuser, Gerhard. 1989. “Die ‘kommunikativ verflüssigte Moral’. Zur Diskursethik 
bei Habermas.“ Pp. 122-145 in Gerhard Bolte (ed.), Unkritische Theorie: Gegen Habermas. 
Lüneburg: zu Klampen. 
Seemann, Axel. 2004. “Lifeworld, Discourse, and Realism: On Jürgen Habermas’s Theory of 
Truth,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 30, 4: 503-514.
Sintomer, Yves. 1999. “Bourdieu et Habermas.“ Pp. 158-162 in Yves Sintomer, La démocratie 
impossible? Politique et modernité chez Weber et Habermas. Paris: La Découverte & Syros.
Steinberger, Peter J. 1999. “Pubic and Private,“ Political Studies 47, 2: 292-313.
Steinhoff, Uwe. 2001. Kritik der kommunikativen Rationalität: Eine Gesamtdarstellung und Analyse 
der kommunikationstheoretischen jüngeren Kritischen Theorie. Marsberg: Die Deutsche 
Bibliothek.
Susen, Simon. 2007. The Foundations of the Social: Between Critical Theory and Reflexive Sociology. 
Oxford: Bardwell.
_____. 2009. “Between Emancipation and Domination: Habermasian Reflections on the 
Empowerment and Disempowerment of the Human Subject,” Pli: The Warwick Journal of 
Philosophy 20: 80-110.
Tassone, Giuseppe. 2005. “Amoral Adorno: Negative Dialectics Outside Ethics,” European 
Volume 3, Number 2, Autumn 2009 125
Binary Categories in Habermas’s Discourse Ethics
Journal of Social Theory 8, 3: 251-267.
Thompson, Janna. 2000. “A Defence of Communicative Ethics,” The Journal of Political 
Philosophy 2, 3: 240-255.
Thompson, John B. 1981. Critical Hermeneutics: A Study in the Thought of Paul Ricoeur and Jür-
gen Habermas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Thompson, John B. 1982. “Universal Pragmatics.” Pp. 116-133 in John B. Thompson and 
David Held (eds.), Habermas: Critical Debates. London: Macmillan. 
Trautsch, Asmus. 2004. “Glauben und Wissen. Jürgen Habermas zum Verhältnis von Philo-
sophie und Religion,“ Philosophisches Jahrbuch 111, 1: 180-198.
Ulbert, Cornelia and Thomas Risse. 2005. “Deliberately Changing the Discourse: What Does 
Make Arguing Effective?,” Acta Politica 40, 3: 351-367.
Villoro, Luis. 1997. El poder y el valor. Fundamentos de una ética política. México, D.F: El Colegio 
Nacional, Fondo de Cultura Económica.
Voirol, Olivier. 2003. “L’espace public et les luttes pour la reconnaissance: De Habermas à 
Honneth. ” Pp. 117-137 in Claudia Barril, Marion Carrel, Juan-Carlos Guerrero and Alicia 
Márquez (eds.), Le public en action : Usages et limites de la notion d’espace public en sciences 
sociales. Paris: L’Harmattan.
Wacquant, Loïc J. D. 1992. “Reason, Ethics, and Politics.” Pp. 47-59 in Pierre Bourdieu and 
Loïc J. D. Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Weintraub, Jeff Alan and Krishan Kumar. (eds.). 1997. Public and Private in Thought and Practice: 
Perspectives on a Grand Dichotomy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
White, Stephen K. 1994. “Diskursethik, schwere Fürsorge und leichte Fürsorge,“ Deutsche 
Zeitschrift für Philosophie 42, 6: 1051-1056.
